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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a theory synthesizing credit-claiming and blame- 
avoidance explanations of congressional behavior and evaluates it 
against asbestos policy in the United States from the I920S through the 
I980s. Public policy is viewed as shaped by officeholders' ability to 
achieve political ends through augmenting information costs and other 
transaction costs facing the public. Public perceptions are seen both as 
the endogenous product of congressional information-cost manipulation 
and as an exogenous constraint that changes in identifiable ways over 
time. Different policy stances - open credit claiming, concealed credit 
claiming, early-stage blame avoidance, and full-scale blame avoidance - 
are predicted to emerge in response to specified conditions, yielding 
implications about the expected timing of public policy changes. Specific 
types of transaction-cost manipulation are predicted to accompany the 
identified policy stances. The US asbestos policy experience is shown to 
be consistent with the predictions of the model. 
i. Introduction 
This article develops a theory synthesizing credit-claiming and blame- 
avoidance explanations of legislators' behavior and evaluates it against 
asbestos policy in the United States from the 1920S through the 198os. 
Whereas previous writers often have adopted 'dominant-strategy' 
explanations that identify either credit claiming or blame avoidance as 
the chief motive of political actors, this paper examines these strategies 
as alternative tools whose serviceability changes in predictable ways in 
response to changes in exogenous constraints. Central to the analysis is 
recognition of officeholders' changing ability over time to achieve politi- 
cal ends through augmenting information costs and other transaction 
* The author thanks Robert Higgs and an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft of 
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costs facing the public. Like the political leitmotifs of credit and blame, 
such transaction-cost augmentation is not confined to asbestos policy- 
making nor to the US Congress: it is a widespread, perhaps universal, 
characteristic of governments. Evidence regarding linkages between 
transaction-cost augmentation and political choices to claim credit or 
avoid blame therefore may prove useful to those analysing government 
policymaking in other nations and institutional contexts. 
In the United States, despite knowledge of the dangers of asbestos 
dating from at least the mid-I930s, the government acted chiefly as a 
promoter of the industry well into the 1970s. This article analyses the 
US government's policy transition from promoter to regulator of the 
asbestos industry, with particular attention to the timing of that transi- 
tion. It explains how optimal political strategies on this issue have 
changed over time by analysing determinants of congressional choices 
between credit-claiming and blame-avoidance strategies.' In so doing, 
the model describes public perceptions as both an endogenous product 
of politicians' information-cost manipulation and an exogenous con- 
straint that changes in identifiable ways over time. 
The analysis has important implications for public policy formulation 
both in the United States and in countries governed by different institu- 
tional structures. Most directly, political leaders in other nations and 
contexts may display credit-claiming and blame-avoidance patterns 
analogous to those observed here. Moreover, as noted above, mechan- 
isms employed by politicians in this case - such as the transaction-cost 
augmenting devices described in section 3 - seem likely to characterize 
other nations' governmental institutions as well as other levels of govern- 
ment within the United States. It is clear, for example, that the US 
President and other heads of state routinely use transaction-cost aug- 
mentation in their efforts to claim credit and avoid blame (see Rose, 
I977: I I-I4). In more than one dimension, the asbestos problem 
appears representative of a broader class of policy issues that transcend 
narrowly national concerns. 
Section 2 of this paper summarizes key elements of the pertinent 
literature. Section 3 presents an extension of the theory that more fully 
unifies and integrates 'credit-claiming' and 'blame-avoidance' analyses 
of legislators' behavior. In section 4 we examine the US government's 
asbestos policy from the I920S through the i980s against the theoretical 
framework presented in previous sections. Section 5 suggests avenues for 
future research, including potential international application of the 
model. 
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2. The Dominant-Strategy Literature and Beyond 
Reelection is assumed to be an overarching objective of politicians 
(Peltzman, I976; Fiorina, I977; Mayhew, I974; Weaver, I986). Even if 
a politician is motivated chiefly by desire to serve his concept of the 
public interest, reelection is prerequisite to those larger ends and so must 
serve as a proximate political objective. The real issue is what political 
strategies best serve this goal. 
Well into the I98os policy scientists routinely averred that 'credit- 
claiming' was the lifeblood of congressmen seeking reelection, their 
dominant strategy. Given the information asymmetries characteristic of 
political decisionmaking, it was expected that members of Congress 
would fully exploit opportunities to claim credit for political benefits that 
flowed to constituents to the outer limits of the public's credulity. In 
situations where credit claiming for delivering benefits was not credible, 
Mayhew (1974: 52-56, 59-62) suggested that politicians gained analo- 
gous electoral rewards by 'position-taking', embracing politically advan- 
tageous policy postures and taking credit for the propriety of their views 
rather than for actually delivering the political goods. 
Challenging the relative importance of credit-claiming political 
behavior, R. Kent Weaver (i 986) proposed blame-avoidance as the 
dominant strategy of reelection-minded congressmen. While not assert- 
ing that politicians never use alternative strategies, Weaver (I986: 371, 
372) stated unequivocally that 'Politicians are motivated primarily by 
the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking to 
claim credit for popular ones.... [M]ost officeholders seek above all not 
to maximize the credit they receive but to minimize blame.' Driving this 
conclusion was the observation that voters display a 'negativity bias': 
they are more likely to notice (and to cast a vote based upon) negative 
personal experiences for which they blame politicians than positive ones 
for which they credit politicians. Hence, in Weaver's analysis, successful 
politicians must discount electoral benefits that flow from credit-claim- 
ing strategies and remain differentially sensitive to political actions cap- 
able of generating blame. 
Weaver (I986: 379) envisioned the choice between credit-claiming 
and blame-avoidance strategies as critically dependent on the 'perceived 
net benefits' and 'perceived net costs' to a policymaker's constituencies, 
referring chiefly to the politician's perceptions of the net costs and benefits 
to his constituents. When a politician judged a policy to entail high net 
costs for one segment of his constituency but high net benefits for 
another constituent group, blame avoidance was predicted to be the 
dominant strategy. Weaver (I988: 22-25) later described the choice 
between credit claiming and blame avoidance as a function of a pro- 
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posal's effects on the policymaker's own policy or personal interests as 
well as its perceived net effects on constituents. In his full enumeration of 
the determinants of blame-avoidance behavior, Weaver (I986: 378) 
identified risk aversion, reelection desires, the number of parties or 
candidates, the distribution of constituency costs and benefits, and 'how 
constituency costs and benefits are translated into political gains and 
losses'. 
But the ease or difficulty of translating constituency costs and benefits 
into political losses and gains is not entirely exogenously determined. 
That is the core issue of this paper. Given a politician's perceptions of 
likely constituent impacts, constituents' perceptions of and responsiveness 
to those benefits and costs can be manipulated within certain bounds 
when so doing serves the politician's electoral or ideological objectives. 
Even the size of constituent groups is to some extent endogenous, for 
transaction-cost augmentation (described in the following section) 
allows a losing group to be kept 'small' in political effectiveness through 
lack of information or other impediments to collective action. Weaver 
(i986: 384-386; I988: 25-29) treated these issues tangentially, noting 
the ability of politicians to limit the agenda, redefine issues, and manipu- 
late perceptions in self-serving ways. 
This paper investigates in more detail the determinants of such 
behavior. As we will see in the next section, the feasible bounds of this 
manipulation change over time due to exogenous changes in political 
constraints, and the shifting bounds of feasible transaction-cost 
manipulation provide a key determinant of politicians' policy choices. 
3. Manipulation of Transaction Costs. Or, How to Eat Your Cake and Have 
It Too (At Least Temporarily) 
Information asymmetries are fundamental to politics. Although the 
existence of information asymmetries has been recognized for decades, 
only recently has research in the policy sciences begun to focus more 
fully on the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to exploit such asym- 
metries to serve their own ends. Recent studies - whether examining 
legislators' incentives to conceal private information strategically 
(Austen-Smith & Riker, I987, 1990), bureaucrats' and legislators' 
mutual incentives to manipulate information given reciprocal informa- 
tional uncertainties (Bendor et al., i987), government officials' incen- 
tives to conceal costs from the public (Higgs, I987) and use other 
strategies to enhance their autonomy (Nordlinger, 198I), or office- 
holders' broader incentives to manipulate a wide range of politically 
relevant transaction costs (Crew & Twight, I990; Twight, I 988) - docu- 
ment on various levels the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to 
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manipulate in self-serving ways transaction costs2 facing each other and 
the public. 
What has not been done is to tie the new literature on governmental 
transaction-cost augmentation to existing insights into the politics of 
credit claiming and blame avoidance. As shown below, the synthesis of 
these approaches helps to explain the time path of politicians' policy 
choices. 
Transaction-cost augmentation denotes efforts by government office- 
holders to increase politically relevant information costs as well as other 
costs (e.g., organizational costs) of collective political action (Twight, 
I988). The target may be voters (as in the interaction between members 
of Congress and the public) or it may be particular groups within 
government (as in the interaction between an agency and a congres- 
sional oversight committee, or between committee members and Con- 
gress at large). Given the unavoidable existence of positive transaction 
costs in political settings, officeholders can and do augment those 
'natural' transaction costs to expand their autonomy and thereby serve 
their own political ends. 
Congressional examples of transaction-cost augmentation include 
euphemistic naming of statutes, concentrating the benefits and diffusing 
the harm associated with governmental actions, misrepresenting the 
anticipated consequences of legislation, concealing the costs of govern- 
mental actions, attaching parochial riders to politically safe bills, and 
the like.3 The common thread in these seemingly disparate examples is 
that each either raises information costs facing the public or raises other 
costs of collective action. If statutes are misleadingly named, if harmful 
consequences are distributed widely so as to reduce per capita costs and 
thereby dilute incentives for political resistance, if expected effects of 
legislation are misrepresented, if governmental costs are concealed, or if 
parochial riders are buried in politically safe bills - then the (transac- 
tion) cost to the public of perceiving and reacting politically to govern- 
mental actions increases. Congressional autonomy is thereby expanded. 
Extending earlier work on 'fiscal illusion' (Buchanan, I967; West & 
Winer, I 980), recent studies have identified determinants of transaction- 
cost augmentation and its implications for the efficiency characteristics 
of legislation (Twight, I988; Crew & Twight, 1990). An officeholder's 
decision favoring a transaction-cost-increasing measure, ceteris paribus, is 
expected to be a positive function of: the complexity of the issue, the 
existence of an appealing justification for the measure [Lindsay's (I976) 
'fog factor'], the existence and magnitude of third-party payoffs, execu- 
tive support and party support for the measure, expected positive 
impacts of the measure on the job security and perquisites of the legis- 
lator, and the perceived importance of the measure to constituents, inter 
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alia. Such a decision is expected to be a negative function of media 
attention or other publicity highlighting the measure's transaction-cost- 
increasing features. While ideology plays a more complex role, the 
model generates predictions about what types of transaction-cost-aug- 
menting measures will be favored by those holding different ideological 
views (Twight, I988: I34-I35). The passage of time plays a less determi- 
nate role in the model, since time may both mitigate complexity and 
facilitate entrenchment of interest groups. 
I will argue in the following pages that transaction-cost augmentation 
plays a dual yet complementary role with respect to a politician's choice 
between blame avoidance and credit claiming. On the one hand, the 
feasible bounds of transaction-cost augmentation determine which of 
these strategies will predominate regarding a particular policy issue at a 
given point in time. Once that strategy emerges, however, transaction- 
cost augmentation then will be used in its service: that is, the specific 
types of transaction-cost augmentation employed will be determined by 
the credit-claiming or blame-avoiding objectives of legislators. 
This intertwining of choice of optimal policy strategy and transaction- 
cost augmentation is complex. The decisions involved are those of 
individual legislators, and they will vary depending upon individual 
objectives and constraints. Nonetheless, the common electoral objective 
coupled with officeholders' assumed responsiveness to marginal political 
costs and benefits enables us to predict changes in aggregate outcomes. 
In fact, there are at least four possible scenarios, simultaneously driven 
(at the macro level) by the feasibility of transaction-cost manipulation 
and determining (at the micro level) the observed types of transaction- 
cost manipulation strategies. 
In what follows, I will use the example of public policies pertaining to 
long-latency disease-generating agents, since that is the focus of sub- 
sequent sections. However, the paradigm discussed below also may 
explain a wide variety of other public policies. 
3.' Open Credit Claiming 
Open credit claiming is the strategy of choice not only when, objectively, 
the associated benefits of a policy choice to a politician's constituents 
outweigh the aggregate costs (Weaver, I986: 379), but more generally 
when the political potency of the losers is smaller than that of the 
winners, even if the aggregate losses to losers outweigh aggregate gains 
to winners. Gains and losses, of course, must be (respectively) discoun- 
ted and compounded to take into account the 'negativity bias' of voters. 
Nonetheless, in broad terms, high per capita gains to winners may 
inspire political activism capable of dominating low per capita but larger 
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aggregate losses to losers, enabling politicians to claim credit for policy 
choices benefiting special interests without fear of reprisal from those 
harmed. 
Essential to this outcome are per capita losses to losers that are - or 
can be made to appear - small. While substantial information asym- 
metries often characterize these situations, even with perfect information 
those experiencing small per capita losses often lack incentives to 
become politically active (e.g., consumers hurt by barriers to interna- 
tional trade). Without the ability to make potential per capita losses 
appear large, political entrepreneurs who might benefit from activating 
losers may be stymied by the losing constituency's lack of motivation. 
This political result thus does not depend on conspiracy among incum- 
bents to benefit special interests. Political entrepreneurs or opposition 
parties simply will find it difficult to generate blame effectively unless 
expected or actual losses, per capita, become large enough to engage 
voters' political attention. 
As the preceding example suggests, open credit claiming regarding a 
policy that creates numerous losers usually involves high natural trans- 
action costs:4 that is, even if everyone attempted to minimize detrimental 
effects of transaction costs surrounding that policy issue, those costs 
would be large. High natural transaction costs might stem from the 
inherent complexity of an issue, low issue salience to constituents and 
the press, a naturally occurring concentration of benefits and dispersion 
of harm, or other circumstances. 
But high natural transaction costs also facilitate transaction-cost aug- 
mentation, as the model's previously discussed determinants make clear. 
In these situations, congressional transaction-cost manipulation may 
involve spreading losses more widely than natural transaction costs 
dictate and fostering misinformation about the existence and nature of 
those losses. Such transaction-cost manipulation enables politicians to 
be open in their credit-claiming behavior, for those harmed in this case 
often fail to perceive either the nature or extent of the costs associated 
with the legislator's policy choice - and, even if they do, lack incentive to 
take political action. 
3.2 Concealed Credit Claiming 
As the availability of information about a public policy's adverse conse- 
quences grows, the feasibility and appeal of open credit claiming on 
behalf of the policy's beneficiaries diminishes. Provided that the nature 
of the harm is not yet common knowledge, however, there is still room 
(and incentive) for legislative action that benefits special interests while 
concealing from the general public the true extent of the policy's costs. 
i 6o Charlotte Twight 
Increased autonomy - to advance political or ideological objectives - 
again is the postulated congressional motive. 
At this stage, although natural transaction costs are falling, the 
balance has not tipped sufficiently to sustain entrepreneurial politics on 
behalf of the losers. Much of the increased information is likely to be in 
the hands of elites (policy specialists) within Congress, the executive 
branch, and elsewhere, groups whose economic and political interests 
often are aligned with the policy's traditional subgovernment relation- 
ships. These policy specialists often have much at stake economically 
and politically based on past actions (or expected future benefits) 
pertaining to the issue. To other groups, the policy issue at this stage is 
likely to remain obscure. 
In these circumstances, the incentive grows for the congressional 
policy elite and other large stakeholders to manipulate transaction costs 
so as to conceal the harm and blunt Congress's and the public's respon- 
siveness to it. This model of political behavior predicts more serious and 
aggressive efforts at cost concealment by these subgroups in such cases. 
For a time their efforts are likely to be successful, since information 
asymmetries and transaction-cost augmentation characterize intra- 
governmental relations as well as those between Congress and the public 
(Twight, I983: I09-I 14; I988: I46-148). 
Credit claiming thus will survive during this period, but that credit 
claiming will be subdued, targeted more specifically to special-interest 
audiences, and rendered more difficult for the general public to perceive. 
Of the four situations described in this section, this case is most con- 
ducive to transaction-cost augmentation aimed at those harmed by con- 
gressional policy choices. 
3.3 Early-Stage Blame Avoidance 
Blame-avoiding behavior is predicted to begin when the feasible bounds 
of transaction-cost manipulation contract so as to make it impossible to 
deceive the general public about adverse consequences of a policy 
choice. Entrepreneurial politics on the issue becomes viable. In this 
situation, Congress will begin to take a variety of blame-avoiding actions 
with respect to those potentially harmed by a policy choice, including 
appointment of study commissions, delegation of responsibility to 
administrative agencies, and other blame-mitigating strategies identified 
by Weaver (I986).5 However, this is an intermediate stage short of full- 
scale blame avoidance. Consequently, legislators may continue to use 
transaction-cost augmentation to shield former policy beneficiaries from 
adverse public reaction. 
In this case, the strategy likely to emerge is preliminary blame 
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avoidance coupled with inconspicuous efforts to protect former benefi- 
ciary groups. For example, in the case of long-latency hazards whose 
dangers become widely known among the general public, Congress 
might support regulations that appear to be more stringent than they 
actually are - for instance, regulations whose loopholes require some 
scientific expertise to detect. Congress in this case mutes public reaction 
through blame avoidance buttressed by transaction-cost augmentation, 
sustaining for special interests greater political protection than a fully 
informed public would likely support. 
Again, one expects greater knowledge, activism, and transaction-cost 
augmentation by congressional policy elites than by other members of 
Congress. Like the general public, nonspecialist members of Congress 
may be targets of misinformation by specialists, remaining uninformed 
about relevant legislative or regulatory loopholes. 
3.4 Full-Scale Blame Avoidance 
Full-scale blame avoidance becomes the strategy of choice when the 
potential costs to the public of a policy decision are severe, and 
exogenously determined public knowledge of these costs is substantial 
and - from the politician's perspective - unavoidable. Here, concealing 
the costs is not a viable political option. In this situation it is no longer 
politically rewarding to claim credit on behalf of those who would bene- 
fit from a policy entailing these costs. Instead, political rewards flow 
from avoiding the blame cast by potential victims. 
In such circumstances politicians have incentives to disclaim prior 
knowledge, blaming others for not acting decisively or not calling the 
situation to their attention. They may manipulate information so as to 
exaggerate the threat to the potential victims. The bigger the perceived 
threat the greater the credit politicians can claim for avoiding harm to 
potential victims - a coalescing of blame-avoidance and credit-claiming 
strategies discussed below. One implication is that overregulation, when 
it occurs, is most likely to occur in what I have labeled as a full-scale 
blame avoidance situation. By exaggerating the problem and encourag- 
ing a 'crisis' mentality, politicians may engender support for a greater 
governmental role in dealing with the supposed crisis (Higgs, I987: 62- 
67), thereby generating the greater electoral benefits associated with 
solving a problem of crisis proportions. The full range of blame- 
avoidance strategies should be observed in this situation, with transac- 
tion-cost augmentation employed in service of the blame-mitigating 
objective. 
Nonetheless, as Weaver (i986: 395-396, note 6) recognized, blame 
and credit are not as distinct as the nomenclature suggests. For example, 
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holding constant the way the policy choice is framed, another way of 
looking at the shift to full-scale blame avoidance is to conceptualize it as 
credit claiming with regard to potential victims (rather than benefici- 
aries) of the policy choice. [In the asbestos policy case examined below, 
this shift would entail avoiding being blamed by potential victims of 
asbestos-related disease - or, alternatively, claiming credit for policy 
choices that curtail harm to this group.] That is, the 'credit' involved is 
credit for avoiding blameworthy actions. Regardless of how the change 
is labeled, however, it entails a distinct shift in political attention from 
one set of constituent interests to another. The key to our analysis is 
what drives this change in officeholders' focus. 
Credit-claiming and blame-avoidance motivations typically coincide 
when officeholders in this situation find it advantageous to protect a 
policy's potential victims. When exogenous changes in political con- 
straints dictate that officeholders alter their policies so as to avoid the 
blame of interests previously harmed, they will attempt to claim credit 
for protecting these interests while seeking to avoid blame for harm that 
(intentionally or unintentionally) slips - and has slipped - through the 
cracks. Beyond conceptualising credit claiming and blame avoidance as 
different 'lenses' for viewing the same behavior, therefore, we expect a 
symbiosis in such cases between officeholders' credit-claiming and 
blame-avoidance strategies with respect to a single interest group. 
4. US Asbestos Policy: Credit and Blame 
Asbestos - a carcinogen known to cause asbestosis (a progressive fibrosis 
of the lungs), lung cancer, mesothelioma (an extremely painful and 
always fatal cancer of the lining of the chest or stomach), and other 
cancers - has been called the 'pollutant of the century' (US House, 
I986a: 53). A general term denoting a group of fibrous minerals, 
asbestos long has been prized for its flexibility and its ability to with- 
stand fire and chemicals. US congressional policy regarding asbestos 
provides evidence on the linkage between transaction-cost parameters 
confronting politicians, their choice of credit-claiming or blame-avoiding 
strategies, and their use of transaction-cost augmentation in service of 
the chosen strategies. 
Congressional policies with respect to asbestos have run the gamut 
from open credit claiming to full-scale blame avoidance. As shown 
below, the timing of these policy changes appears consistent with the 
model presented in Section 3 while inconsistent with dominant-strategy 
models. Despite some overlap in the transition years, US asbestos policy 
has evolved as this model predicts in conjunction with identifiable 
changes in external constraints on transaction-cost augmentation. 
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4.1 Credit Claiming Before 1945 
Until the mid-I 930s, federal asbestos policy was formulated in the 
absence of widespread understanding, by the public or by Congress, of 
the mineral's dangers. Despite the fact that, between I 9 I 3 and i 9 I 9, six 
states made asbestosis a compensable occupational disease - and despite 
the US Department of Labor's I9I8 report that insurance companies 
were refusing to insure asbestos workers because of their 'assumed 
health risks' - that knowledge had not been assimilated by most policy- 
makers (Maguire, I 983: 597; US House, I 98 I: 34; Hoffman, I 9 I 8). 
In this context, Congress took asbestos-related actions allowing mem- 
bers to claim credit with affected interest groups. The credit-claiming 
environment resembled that for domestic producers of nontoxic prod- 
ucts - shoes, sugar, tin - in that affected politicians could engineer 
political approval of parochial measures without need to conceal service 
activities benefiting these constituencies. 
Since the US has never been a major producer of raw asbestos fiber, 
congressional policy most often benefited domestic producers of 
manufactured asbestos products. For example, in its tariff policies from 
the late i8oos to the I920S, Congress established Io per cent to 40 per 
cent tariffs on imported asbestos products, permitting the domestic 
industry to grow 'from a capitalization of a few hundred thousand dol- 
lars, and employing not over i00 men, to the industry of to-day [I92I] 
with a capital and surplus of between fifty and seventy-five million and 
employing about 20,000 men....' (US House, I92 I: 34I 2). Protectionist 
measures were put forth routinely with industry advocates extolling the 
mineral's virtues while passing samples of raw and manufactured 
asbestos products around the room for congressmen to admire (US 
House, I929: 7I46; US House, I92I: 34II). 
Although parochial motivations at that time did not require conceal- 
ment, transaction-cost augmentation was evident. Tariffs were put forth 
in the name of fairness and competition to 'equalize production cost' 
between US firms and foreign competitors. And when, under the 
National Recovery Administration, the asbestos products industry was 
given cartel-like powers in 1933, the new arrangement was called a 'code 
of fair competition'. 
4.2 Credit Claiming, I945-I969 
Understanding when government officials knew of asbestos-related 
health threats is crucial to the interpretation of asbestos policy after 
World War II. Elsewhere, I have documented early knowledge of the 
dangers of asbestos by many within government (Twight, I99I). In 
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what follows, we trace the widening sphere of such governmental under- 
standing, with particular attention to congressional stockpiling policy, 
the Bureau of Mines, and the Navy. 
We will see that much of the information that might have inspired 
remedial congressional action on the asbestos issue during this period 
was concentrated in bureaucracies whose missions, cultures, and con- 
straints discouraged aggressive action on this issue. Within the Navy, an 
aggressive stance regarding the negative health effects of asbestos would 
have seemed incompatible with the Navy's defense mission (especially 
during World War II); within the Bureau of Mines, such a stance would 
have seemed incompatible with that Bureau's commitment to mining 
interests. Congressional oversight in these areas, often aligned with the 
same interests, faced similar incentives. Those within Congress most 
likely to encounter the new information often had incentives to block its 
dissemination. 
To the average member of Congress, the asbestos issue thus remained 
obscure. Given its complexity and lack of publicity, the issue gained 
little salience with either Congress at large or the public: hence, despite 
the new knowledge, no effective demand was placed on Congress for 
asbestos regulation. Existing institutional structures tended to compart- 
mentalize emerging knowledge about asbestos hazards in agencies and 
committees with little incentive to pursue the issue. 
However, by the mid-I930s, an important subset of government 
officeholders was aware of the by then 'widely accepted' scientific fact 
that inhalation of asbestos dust 'could cause asbestosis, often fatal' (US 
House, i982a: 58). There is contemporaneous evidence that some mem- 
bers of Congress were apprised of these dangers. For example, in I936 
hearings on silicosis and metal-mining conditions, senators were given a 
list describing occupational disease coverage in various states. The entry 
for North Carolina reported that 'Asbestosis and silicosis [are] included 
among the compensable diseases.' Asbestos and silica were described as 
'the two principal dusty industries'. The text of the North Carolina 
provisions explicitly referred to 'disablement or death' resulting from 
asbestosis, silicosis, or lead poisoning (US Senate, 1936: 19, 24-25). 
Nonetheless, the Committee on Education and Labor continued to focus 
primarily on silicosis, whose victims often died within a few months on 
the job. The long latency of asbestos-related disease veiled the drama 
instrumental in triggering congressional policy response (see Bosso, 
I987: II5-125). 
The US Public Health Service (PHS) also had early knowledge. In 
1935 and 1938 PHS published reports documenting the prevalence of 
asbestosis in asbestos workers (Lanza, I935; Dreessen et al., 1938). Dr. 
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Edward Brandt of the US Department of Health and Human Services 
testified: 
PHS began research into the health effects of asbestos exposure in the mid- 
I930's. These early research efforts found excessive lung disease (asbestosis) in 
asbestos workers and later suggested that lung cancer may occur more 
frequently in asbestos workers than in the general populations. In 1938, based 
upon the limited data then available, PHS recommended tentative threshold 
limit value guidelines for controlling occupational exposure to asbestos until 
better data became available. ... (US House, I983b: 144). 
Thus by the early 1940S the dangers of asbestos were known by a 
significant and expanding subset of political actors in the federal govern- 
ment. How did policy change to reflect this growing awareness? Public 
interest theories of regulation (Kelman, I987) would predict emergence 
of regulatory policies to protect the public from the known hazards. 
Weaver's (i 986) model likewise would suggest a policy change to blame- 
avoidance mode. That did not happen. In fact, no major changes in 
asbestos regulation occurred until the 1970S - some thirty years later. 
The only significant change that occurred during this period is that 
credit-claiming opportunities with respect to asbestos interests were 
restructured in ways making them less apparent to the public.6 Federal 
policy continued to protect asbestos industry interests, enabling affected 
officeholders to claim credit with those groups. But credit-claiming 
opportunities were cultivated in ways unlikely to receive widespread 
public scrutiny. As shown below, transaction-cost augmentation was 
used both to misinform the public about the dangers of asbestos and to 
deflect adverse political reaction to pro-industry policies. 
Stockpile policy typified Congress's posture during this period. With 
the war emergency past, asbestos stockpile policy became the province 
of special interests, administered without regard to its health conse- 
quences for the general public. After the war, through sales authorized 
by Congress, the government sold the bulk of the asbestos stockpile into 
the private market, attaching no warning or labeling requirement 
regarding the product's proper use (US Bureau of Mines, I946: 144). 
The government then undertook to stimulate and subsidize raw asbestos 
production in the United States. Using the Defense Production Act, the 
Domestic Minerals Program Extension Act of I953, and other laws, the 
government subsidized exploration for and production of asbestos, pur- 
chasing much of the new output for the stockpile even though it was 
acknowledged to be below stockpile quality. As late as I963 the US 
Office of Minerals Exploration financed up to 50 per cent of approved 
costs for asbestos exploration (US Bureau of Mines, I963: 251). 
Insiders acknowledged that there was no 'national defense' rationale 
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for these actions, stating that 'all defense needs have been met' and that 
the purpose of the program was to 'assist the industry' (US House, 1956: 
i8). Moreover, despite new evidence of the mineral's dangers,7 between 
I967 and I977 Congress approved issuance of '200 contracts for the sale 
of asbestos from the stockpile,' benefiting asbestos product manufac- 
turers (for whom raw asbestos was an input) by authorising the release 
of 75,866 short tons of stockpiled asbestos into the stream of commerce 
(US House, i982b: 9; US House, I985a: 337-338). Nonetheless, the 
obscurity of stockpile policy and its politically cultivated cloak of 
national security kept these facts from the purview of most US citizens. 
Other governmental strategies during this period overtly increased 
asbestos-related information costs facing the general public. For exam- 
ple, throughout the critical years, the US Bureau of Mines (BuMines) 
used its Minerals Yearbook to promote the asbestos industry, first conceal- 
ing and later downplaying the mineral's dangers to human life. It is 
certain that BuMines knew of the dangers, for BuMines reported to the 
Eagle-Picher Company in 1932 that "'It is now known that asbestos 
dust is one of the most dangerous dusts to which man is exposed"' 
(quoted in Castleman, I986: 488). Yet between 1935 and I963, the 
BuMines yearbook's annual summary of literature relevant to the 
industry did not mention even one article documenting health hazards 
attributable to asbestos. Indeed, the word 'asbestosis' does not appear in 
the yearbook until I964. In the late I96os BuMines (I967: 208) des- 
cribed impending investigations as designed to discover 'if there are 
dangers' associated with asbestos. The yearbook lauded new asbestos 
products and uses throughout this period. In the I970S BuMines (I976: 
i86) was still referring to the 'alleged health effects' of asbestos. 
Similarly, the Navy's shipyard asbestos policies during this period 
served industry and the military bureaucracy to the detriment of ship- 
yard asbestos workers and their families. Approximately 4.5 million 
workers were exposed to asbestos without warning of the hazard while 
working at government and contract shipyards during World War II. 
That the Navy knew of the hazard was indicated in a I941 memo from 
C. S. Stephenson, commander in charge of the Navy's Division of 
Preventive Medicine, stating that "'we are having a considerable 
amount of work done in asbestos and from my observations I am certain 
we are not protecting the men as we should. This is a matter of official 
report from several of our Navy yards"' (quoted in US House, i985a: 
i 86). 
Although the Navy in I943 adopted the PHS standard for asbestos 
exposure, most shipyards did not meet the safety requirements, and the 
Navy did not enforce the standard (US House, ig8oa: 673-674). During 
the war that decision was understandable, consistent with imperatives of 
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mission and culture in the Navy. However, well into the 1970s, the Navy 
withheld information from shipyard workers exposed to asbestos (US 
House, I985a: i86, 305). Although it carried out pulmonary function 
tests on some shipyard workers in the I960s, it did not inform them of 
the medical results, even when the exams disclosed abnormalities con- 
sistent with asbestos-related disease in a majority of the workers X-rayed 
(US House, I978: 268-27 I). Information about the asbestos hazard was 
not widely disclosed to shipyard workers until 1973, when the Navy first 
required caution signs and warnings regarding asbestos (US House, 
i983b: 205). 
That both the Navy and BuMines took actions consistent with their 
respective missions and avoided raising bureaucratically relevant costs 
is not surprising. That Congress did not intercede also is not surprising, 
in light of the theory discussed in section 3. Congressional committees 
with oversight responsibilities were predominantly committed to the 
traditional missions of those bureaucracies. To the extent that they 
acquired knowledge, those committees had little incentive to publicize 
information about asbestos health risks that would interfere with tradi- 
tional functions - for example, by raising the costs of achieving mission 
objectives. Dissemination of the knowledge thus was curtailed. 
To the average member of Congress - and to the broader public - 
asbestos health issues remained relatively obscure during the I945-I969 
period. Institutional structures compartmentalized knowledge in ways 
that permitted policy specialists to play traditional subgovernment 
politics long after a transaction-cost-minimising model of government 
would have predicted a major policy change. Officeholders did not 
switch to a blame-avoidance strategy to protect user interests as soon as 
other theories would have predicted. Through congressional stockpiling 
policy, Bureau of Mines industry propaganda, and Navy information 
manipulation, political actors continued to pursue policies for which 
they could (privately) claim credit with asbestos producer interests. The 
costs to more diffuse groups were obscured, their political action 
blunted. 
4.3 Blame Avoidance, I970-1985 
About 1970 Congress made the transition in its asbestos policy into what 
I have called 'early stage' blame avoidance. Why 1970? Around this 
time it became impossible to conceal from the general public - or 
nonspecialists in Congress - the hazards associated with asbestos use. 
The New York Academy of Sciences had held its historic international 
meeting on the biological effects of asbestos in I964, calling worldwide 
attention to the asbestosis and fatal cancers that threatened not only 
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those who worked with raw asbestos fibers but also those who worked 
with asbestos insulation (Selikoff et al., I965). The media and the courts 
began to open previously constricted conduits of information. 
By I970 twenty five years had elapsed since the massive asbestos 
exposures at the shipyards during World War II - enough time for the 
20-40 year latency period to have expired for many affected workers. 
Asbestos-related lawsuits were becoming more common, creating 
graphic images of the human losses involved. Media attention increased 
accordingly. And the law itself was changing in ways that focused public 
attention on culpability: in 1973 the landmark Borel v. Fiberboard Paper 
Products et al. case greatly increased the liability of asbestos insulation 
manufacturers, easing plaintiffs' access to judicial remedies r493 Fed. 2d 
I076 (5th Cir., I973)]. A Gallup poll taken in I978 indicated that '50 per 
cent of all Americans knew asbestos exposure had an adverse effect on 
health' (US House, ig8ob: 341). 
From a theoretical perspective, these developments signaled a major 
change in exogenously determined constraints on politicians' ability to 
use transaction-cost augmentation in support of policies enabling them 
to claim credit with asbestos producer groups. A much larger fraction of 
the general public and of Congress knew that asbestos was dangerous, 
and it was apparent that - quite outside the control of politicians - such 
understanding would grow, not diminish. Since it was no longer possible 
to use transaction-cost augmentation to prevent this widespread under- 
standing of the dangers, a rational politician now would find himself 
better served by active policy measures to counteract blame for asbestos- 
related harm. In light of the serviceability of established political rela- 
tionships, however, we would expect some backsliding by policy special- 
ists benefiting asbestos producer interests. Thus we expect the use of 
transaction-cost augmenting strategies by policy experts to protect pro- 
ducer interests within the broader movement to establish for Congress a 
credible facade of blame avoidance. 
Consistent with the blame-avoidance model, in the I 970S and early 
I980s Congress passed numerous laws empowering federal agencies to 
deal with environmental hazards such as asbestos, as entrepreneurial 
politics on these issues drove the policy process. Among them were the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act ( 970), Clean Air Act amendments 
(I970), the Consumer Product Safety Act (I972), the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (1976), and asbestos-in-schools laws described below. Here, 
we narrow our focus to asbestos-related uses of these broader powers. 
We will examine the congressional-bureaucratic policy nexus in asbestos 
regulations issued during this period by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and 
the Environmental Protection Agency. 
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Because agency decisionmaking is the product of many influences - 
not only Congress, but also the President, executives within the agency, 
agency staff, judicial rulings, and so forth - it is not accurate to con- 
ceptualize the near-term regulatory process as necessarily dominated by 
congressional desires.8 Indeed, we will see evidence below of the 
sometimes powerful influence of executive branch pressure on agency 
regulatory decisionmaking. 
However, in the long run, one cannot disregard congressional 
acquiescence in agency regulatory activity. If a majority disagrees with 
agency action, Congress can express its desire to alter that policy by 
remedial exercise of its power to authorize and appropriate, to control 
agency mission and resources. In asbestos policymaking (particularly 
the school asbestos regulations discussed below), Congress sometimes 
has done so. The effectiveness of those control mechanisms is a separate 
issue, one dependent on the severity of principal-agent problems 
between Congress and the agency in a specific context. That issue aside, 
unless the agencies or relevant oversight committees have successfully 
deceived Congress, longer elapsed time without congressional counter- 
move thus renders more plausible the characterization of agency policy 
as a manifestation of Congress's (constrained) will. 
The general pattern documented below is that of Congress in early 
blame-avoidance mode - delegating responsibility, requiring studies, 
fracturing responsibility among competing agencies, passing the buck, 
using the agencies as scapegoats - while often not countermanding 
regulatory decisions that shielded producer interests. 
4.3.I Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
There is much more to the OSHA story than blame avoidance - institu- 
tional impediments embedded in administrative structure (Shapiro & 
McGarity, I989), the bureaucratic appeal of regulating visible safety 
hazards rather than chronic health hazards (Viscusi, I983; Wilson, 
I989), executive influence (Shapiro & McGarity, I989; Kelman, 1980), 
conflicting interest-group pressures stemming from the concentration of 
regulatory benefits and costs (Wilson, I989), pro-protection values of 
agency officials (Kelman, I980), and the like. As Wilson (1989: 247) 
notes, it is a story of congressional influence, not dominance. But it is the 
blame-avoiding function of OSHA's regulations for Congress that con- 
cerns us here. 
OSHA asbestos regulations in many ways provide a model of early 
blame-avoidance strategy. How can one blame an agency or a Congress 
that oversees implementation of workplace asbestos standards increas- 
ing in stringency from a permissible exposure limit of 12 fibers per cubic 
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centimeter (f/cc) in I97I to a time-weighted average of 5 f/cc in 1972, 
2 f/cc in I 976, and 0.2 f/cc in I986?9 
But appearances are misleading. By expressing the standard in fibers 
per cubic centimeter, OSHA made the rules seem more restrictive than 
they were. Since an average worker inhales 6 to Io million cubic cen- 
timeters of air on an 8-hour shift, the 1972 standard translated into 
30,000,000 to 50,000,000 permissible fibers per shift, the I976 standard 
I2,000,000 to 20,000,000 permissible fibers. A 'fiber' was defined to 
exclude asbestos fibers 5 microns in length or shorter, so that unlimited 
exposure to shorter fibers was allowed over and above the permissible 
exposure limit for the longer fibers. Although apparently less toxic than 
the longer fibers (Mossman et al., I990), the shorter fibers were known to 
be capable of generating disease. Moreover, until I986 the regulations 
only attempted to protect workers from asbestosis, not from cancers 
triggered by much lower exposure levels. 
In addition, OSHA regulations throughout this period specified a 
type of optical microscopy called phase contrast microscopy (PCM) as 
the accepted method for measuring ambient asbestos levels. Although 
cheaper than the alternative transmission electron microscopy (TEM) 
techniques, PCM is less reliable, prompting asbestos expert Anthony 
Natale to label use of optical microscopy as 'this little-understood 
scandal' (US House, I986a: 300). While acknowledging PCM's defi- 
ciencies, OSHA justified its decision based on its lower costs (5i Federal 
Register 22685, 20 June I 986). 
Of course, there are legitimate arguments over the cost effectiveness, 
in a cost-benefit sense, of the alternative measurement techniques. In the 
circumstances, however, OSHA's asbestos regulations provided the best 
of both worlds for Congress. Delegation of responsibility - when coupled 
with apparently stringent regulations whose loopholes required techni- 
cal knowledge to understand - virtually guaranteed that a congressman 
could avoid blame. Contrived increases in information costs reduced the 
risk that many would perceive the loopholes except those who benefited 
from them. And if they did, Congress had the agency as its scapegoat. It 
therefore makes political sense from a blame-avoidance perspective as 
well as an interest-group perspective that Congress over the years had 
'harassed OSHA without fundamentally changing it' (Wilson, I989: 
249). 
4.3.2 Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 
When Congress delegated authority to the CPSC in 1972 to issue regula- 
tions to control hazards in consumer products, it put another blame- 
avoidance mechanism in place. Any future problems with consumer 
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products could be - and, in the case of asbestos, were - blamed on the 
agency. 
The CPSC issued no regulations governing asbestos-containing con- 
sumer products until 1977, and Congress did not intervene. Household 
appliances and floor coverings, do-it-yourself household repair products, 
and even children's playthings (such as papier-mache containing up to 
50 per cent asbestos) were sold throughout this period without labeling 
their asbestos content. In I977, the CPSC banned two asbestos-contain- 
ing products particularly dangerous to homeowners: drywall patching 
compounds and asbestos-containing emberising agents used in firepla- 
ces. Labeling requirements were not established until I986 (5I Federal 
Register 33910, 24 September I986). 
An incident particularly revealing of the prevailing blame-avoidance 
posture involved congressional reaction to the CPSC's treatment of 
asbestos-containing hairdryers. In 1977 the CPSC commissioned a 
report that found approximately i oo consumer products, including 
hand-held hairdryers, to contain asbestos. The CPSC initially chose not 
to pursue the issue. When a television station had the hairdryers tested, 
one in five contained asbestos, some discharging asbestos fibers 'in the 
same range' as asbestos levels deemed hazardous in public schools (US 
Senate, I979: 3-4). These results, presented to the CPSC on 24 March 
1979, were broadcast on television four days later. Only then did Con- 
gress act: the chairman of the CPSC was called on the carpet in congres- 
sional hearings, providing representatives ample opportunity to 
excoriate the agency and to distance themselves from it politically (US 
House, 1979: 78-84). A blame-avoidance mechanism was in place, and 
legislators used it. 
Of course blame avoidance by Congress is by no means the only 
explanation of the CPSC experience. Much has been written about the 
effects of CPSC's status as a multi-member independent commission, 
the overall paucity of its regulatory activity, its reluctance to regulate 
chronic hazards, its choice of regulations with no significant effect on 
safety, and its adoption of regulations not warranted from a cost-benefit 
perspective (Viscusi, I984). On the congressional side, however, blame 
avoidance has been an important part of that story. 
4.3.3 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
The EPA's asbestos air emissions and asbestos-in-schools regulations 
during this period exemplify ways in which blame-avoiding strategies 
were coupled with regulations that delivered less than they seemed to 
promise, making it difficult for the public to assess asbestos-related risks 
under the chosen regulatory structure. While the executive branch was 
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sometimes instrumental in bringing about these results, business inter- 
ests, environmental groups, and the courts also played substantial roles 
in shaping EPA policy (Marcus, I980; Wilson, I989). 
These regulations juxtapose conditions in which Congress in one case 
acquiesced in, and in another resisted, agency regulatory action. With 
air emissions, congressional acquiescence in transaction-cost-increasing 
measures accompanied a low-visibility regulatory policy: the chosen 
policy was complex and obscure enough to enable Congress to avoid 
blame and credibly convey the impression of appropriate action. With 
the school asbestos regulations, agency inaction due to executive branch 
pressure threatened Congress's ability to avoid blame in a high- 
visibility, publicity-generating policy arena: Congress accordingly 
fought the agency to protect its own blame-free posture. The school 
asbestos issue was more amenable than the air emission standard to 
oversimplification conducive to blame generation, and Congress in the 
school asbestos case went to greater lengths to avoid blame. 
Air Emissions 
During the I970s, the EPA's air emission standards for asbestos, like 
OSHA's regulations, were consistent with Congress's need to avoid 
blame, and Congress did not attempt to countermand those regulations. 
Having labeled asbestos a hazardous air pollutant in I97I, the EPA in 
I973 issued regulations prohibiting 'visible emissions' from the milling 
and manufacturing of asbestos and prescribing asbestos-related work 
practices for building demolition, standards extended to building 
renovation and waste collection and disposal in 1975. In I973 the EPA 
restricted spray application of certain friable asbestos materials, tighten- 
ing the regulations in I978. r36 Federal Register 593 I, 3 I March I97 I; 38 
Federal Register 8829, 6 April I973; 40 Federal Register 8299, I4 October 
1975; 43 Federal Register 26374, I9 June I978]. On the surface, these 
measures portrayed an activist government protecting citizens from 
asbestos-related harm. 
They were useful first steps. However, unbeknownst to the average 
citizen, the 'no visible emissions' standard did not insulate the surround- 
ing populace from asbestos-related disease. As experts inside and out- 
side of government knew, asbestos fibers too small to be seen by the 
naked eye were highly toxic and long implicated in the etiology of 
asbestos-related disease. While the regulations offered some protection, 
they delivered much less than a nonspecialist would have inferred from 
their language, thereby shielding asbestos industry interests from politi- 
cal pressure for more costly cleanup efforts. 
Regulations governing sprayed-on asbestos followed a similar pattern. 
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Despite widespread belief that spraying of asbestos-containing materials 
(ACM) on interior surfaces of buildings was prohibited in I 973, the only 
sprayings banned at that time were fireproofing and insulation appli- 
cations - arguably uses with the greatest offsetting benefits. The EPA 
allowed applications labeled purely decorative to continue unabated until 
1978. 
From I973 until I978, with the risk to human health well known to 
policy specialists and others within government, thousands of tons of 
'decorative' ACM were sprayed onto the ceilings and walls of homes and 
other buildings. Mere oversight? Perhaps, but one cannot overlook the 
government and industry interests that benefited from this little-under- 
stood policy. The government itself was releasing large quantities of 
asbestos from its own stockpile during this period, with major sales 
occurring in 1972 and 1974 (US House, I985a: 338). Experts commis- 
sioned by the EPA later concluded that 'sprayed asbestos material 
within buildings may become the most significant source of environmen- 
tal contamination in the future' (Sawyer & Spooner, 1978: I-i-6). 
Additional transaction-cost augmentation buttressed these blame- 
avoiding regulatory measures. For example, as late as I982 the EPA 
continued in its public brochures to understate the scope of the asbestos 
problem, claiming that 'Some large buildings and a few homes built or 
remodeled between I945 and I978 may contain a crumbly, asbestos- 
containing material which has been either sprayed or troweled onto the 
ceilings or walls' (US Environmental Protection Agency, 1982: 6, 
emphasis added). More candid in their testimony before Congress, 
however, EPA officials allowed that 'any building' built from World 
War II through the I960s 'has as much chance [as schools] of having 
asbestos,' and that friable asbestos was estimated to be in 59 per cent of 
the large residential apartment buildings in a I984 national survey 
population (US House, I986a: 34; US Senate, I988: 68). 
Asbestos in Schools 
The asbestos-in-schools issue during the early i980S was promoted by 
Congress and resisted by the Reagan administration. After Congress 
passed the Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act (ASH- 
DCA) in I980 and the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act 
(ASHAA) in I984 [Public Law 96-270, 14 June I980, 94 Stat. 487; 
Public Law 98-377, i i August I984, Title V, 98 Stat. I 287], the 
administration for ideological and budgetary reasons sought to block 
both funding and substantive regulations. Encountering this resistance, 
Congress used authorising legislation to avoid blame and ascribe it 
instead to the administration and the bureaucracy, simultaneously 
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claiming credit for congressional attempts to mitigate the school 
asbestos hazard (see US House, I982C, I983a). 
ASHDCA appropriations were blocked while Carter was still 
president. The Act authorized the Department of Education to adminis- 
ter federal grants and interest-free loans to finance detection and 
cleanup of asbestos in schools. In I980 OMB rejected Education's 
appropriation request due to 'other budget priorities', and the programs 
were never funded (US General Accounting Office, I982: 2 I). 
Executive resistance to the school asbestos programs and their fund- 
ing continued for most of the two-term Reagan presidency (US House, 
I984: 82; US House, I987a). The program's impairment was too great 
to allow Congress to retain its blame-free appearance, and Congress 
responded legislatively. For instance, when the administration pressured 
the EPA into abandoning its early efforts at a regulation specifying 
appropriate abatement actions, Congress passed new legislation 
mandating such regulations (see section 4.4.I, infra). 
Blaming behavior continued throughout the period. For example, 
when in I982 the EPA issued a rule governing identification of friable 
asbestos in elementary and secondary schools using authority under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act [47 Federal Register 23360, 27 May I982; 
Public Law 94-469, ii October I976, 90 Stat. 2003], Congress openly 
blamed the agency for the rule's deficiencies.'0 In public hearings, 
representatives lashed out at EPA officials, asserting that the EPA was 
'holding out the impression of action when there really isn't any action. 
...' (US House, I986a: 22). As Rep. Norman Lent (R., N.Y.) stated, 'it 
is popular here in the Congress to heap all kinds of abuse on EPA and 
blame them for all the ills of the world during an election year' (US 
House, I984: I2). 
4.3.4 Attempts to Limit Government Liability 
Any discussion of government blame avoidance during this period 
would be incomplete without reference to the US government's overt 
denials of asbestos-related liability and attempts to limit that liability via 
statutory law. Throughout the 1970S and early i980S, as asbestos litiga- 
tion multiplied, government officials consistently disclaimed tort 
liability to asbestos victims. As J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney 
General in the US Department ofJustice, put it in I982, 'It is the basic 
position of the Government - and we have taken this in all the litigations 
- that the Government has no tort liability; that is, no liability in tort, to 
the victims of asbestos disease' (US House, i982b: 5). Federal officials 
contended that the government's only potential liability was workers' 
compensation to federal employees under the Federal Employees' Com- 
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pensation Act, arguing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
precluded asbestos tort claims. 
As the I980s progressed, Congress investigated alternative settlement 
mechanisms, such as the private and voluntary Wellington group 
asbestos claims facility (US Senate, I985b). Concurrently, after its 
bankruptcy declaration in I982, the Manville Corporation (formerly 
Johns-Manville, the largest US asbestos firm) worked towards forma- 
tion of a trust fund to compensate victims in lieu of judicial remedies. 
Fearing that the government might be the only remaining deep pocket if 
asbestos companies were destroyed by the extraordinary legal costs they 
were experiencing, Congress had strong incentives to facilitate these 
endeavors. 
Meanwhile, members of Congress introduced numerous bills that 
would have curtailed asbestos victims' rights to pursue tort remedies 
against asbestos product manufacturers and the government. Although 
put forth as victim compensation bills, a critical provision in each was an 
'exclusive remedy' clause that restricted the victim's compensation to 
amounts awarded under the bill's provisions." While parochial motives 
were sometimes transparent, some of these bills had a broad base of 
congressional support.'2 Endorsing such measures gave the politically 
valuable appearance of support for victims' interests, while the 
exclusive-remedy provisions and limitations on governmental liability 
reduced the political cost of conveying that impression. 
In the end, however, the changing informational context that gave 
increased political viability to victims' interest groups frustrated these 
maneuvers. Despite much testimony in numerous hearings, the bills 
were stymied by conflicting interest-group pressures, 13 as members of 
Congress discovered that endorsement of such legislation would provoke 
blame. Interest groups were vocal on both sides of these bills, with 
victims' groups testifying to their 'unanimous outrage at this legislation' 
while industry representatives endorsed the measures (US Senate, 
i985a: 3I, 92, I26). In not passing the bills, Congress again took a 
blame-avoiding stance. 
4.4 Blame Avoidance, I986-I989 
Developments inside and outside of government contributed to changing 
public perceptions of asbestos health hazards in the early to mid-ig8os. 
Inside government, activity surrounding the above-described legislative 
proposals increased public awareness of the issue. Jumping on the band- 
wagon [another blame-avoidance strategy identified by Weaver (I986)], 
the government itself disseminated information about asbestos health 
issues. A public information campaign sponsored by HEW in I978-I979 
I 76 Charlotte Twight 
accompanied an increase in the fraction of the American public aware of 
asbestos health risks from 50 per cent to 68 per cent (US House, ig8ob: 
34I). While HEW's action internally may be explained partly in terms 
of mission and executive politics, it also served the blame-avoidance 
motives then predominant in Congress. In I978, a Congress member 
unquestionably would have made himself a target for blame by overtly 
opposing such information dissemination. 
Outside government, the hearings and lawsuits prompted media 
coverage of the asbestos issue, which independently altered the con- 
straints faced by politicians. When NOVA broadcast a moving 
documentary dealing with the issue in March i983, many Americans' 
perceptions of the asbestos issue were altered, and the cumulative 
impact of such media coverage redefined the political environment in 
which asbestos policy was made (US House, i983b: 286 ff.). The 
Manville Corporation bankruptcy settlement in I986 provided further 
grist for the media mill. From a congressman's perspective in the mid- 
I980s, support for the asbestos industry, if perceived by the public, 
threatened adverse electoral consequences. 
By I986, circumstances thus were conducive to what I have labeled 
full-scale blame avoidance by federal policymakers. However, as noted 
in section 3.4, when Congress shifts from supporting the constituency 
formerly benefited by a policy (e.g., asbestos industry interests) to sup- 
porting the constituency previously harmed by that policy (e.g., asbestos 
victims), there is a mingling of blame-avoiding and credit-claiming 
motifs implicit in many policy actions. Measures adopted during this 
stage often may be characterized either as blame avoidance ('Don't 
blame me; I supported a statute mitigating harm to asbestos victims') or 
credit claiming ('Give me credit; I supported a statute mitigating harm 
to asbestos victims'). As discussed earlier, the theory does not rest on 
how we label this shift. Rather, the theory's central focus is the political 
environment for transaction-cost augmentation and its role in the timing 
of this change in constituent interests effectively driving the policy 
process. 
Again, during this stage the appearance of not meriting blame rather 
than the reality of not taking blameworthy actions is the expected con- 
gressional desideratum. Theory here suggests political exaggeration of 
asbestos dangers coupled with dramatic steps to counteract the asserted 
crisis, accompanied by attribution of blame to others for past and 
present problems. In general, the greater public awareness and greater 
susceptibility of the issue to (blame-generating) oversimplification by 
rival politicians at this stage render likely more extreme congressional 
countermeasures. While this article does not attempt to specify optimal 
asbestos regulations, the incentives for transaction-cost augmentation in 
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managing toxic substances thus invite regulation that is first late, then 
inadequate, and finally perhaps excessive. 
In this context, the US government adopted two regulations most 
often cited as instances of overregulation: the I987 asbestos-in-schools 
regulations and the I989 EPA asbestos product ban. The school regula- 
tions have been criticized for imposing huge costs on schools while often 
worsening rather than mitigating asbestos-related risks (US Senate, 
I988: 48, I84; Mossman et al., I 990: 299; Abelson, I990). The asbestos 
product ban has been called economically inefficient on the grounds that 
it implies a cost per life saved far in excess of that for other lifesaving 
federal programs (Viscusi, I989: 89, 99-ioo; Morrall, I986).'4 
4.4. I1987 Asbestos-In-Schools Regulations 
Chiding the EPA for its prior inaction, Congress in I986 passed the 
Asbestos Hazards Emergency Response Act (AHERA), which required 
the EPA to develop regulations governing the appropriate response 
actions to deal with asbestos-containing materials in elementary and 
secondary schools (Public Law 99-5I9, 22 October I986, Ioo Stat. 
2970). Congress stressed the acute danger to school children, citing EPA 
estimates that 'i5 million school children ... and I.4 million school 
employees attend school and work in buildings which have asbestos 
materials' (US House, I986b: I 4). 
The EPA issued the required AHERA rules on 30 October I987 (52 
Federal Register 4I826, 30 October I987). Besides requiring local educa- 
tion agencies (LEAs) to have schools inspected by accredited inspectors 
and to develop a management plan for any ACM found, the new rules 
designated the circumstances in which five possible response actions 
could be undertaken by the LEAs. In addition, the regulations specified 
testing procedures to be used to ascertain completion of response 
actions, requiring the phasing in of transmission electron microscopy 
(TEM) testing over a two-year period. 
Of most significance here, however, is the manner in which the EPA 
developed these regulations. Using what Congress and the EPA called 
'regulatory negotiation' or negotiated rulemaking, the 'EPA established 
a committee of representatives of interested organizations, and charged 
them with the task of writing ... a comprehensive regulatory proposal.' 
With Congress's tacit approval, the EPA delegated its responsibility to 
draft the AHERA regulations, openly committing itself 'to proposing 
whatever the committee can agree on' (US House, I987b: 66, 126). That 
it did, and the committee's proposals were adopted. 
Whatever its virtues in reducing bureaucratic costs and encouraging 
early compromise, the process provided an ideal vehicle for blame 
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avoidance at the congressional as well as agency levels. When com- 
plaints arise regarding the I987 AHERA regulations, Congress - having 
passed the buck to the EPA - can use the EPA as its scapegoat, and the 
EPA in turn can blame the actual interest-group decisionmakers to 
whom it passed the buck. As predicted by the theory, Congress with its 
AHERA policies positioned itself to gain high-profile credit for prevent- 
ing asbestos-related harm to school children while establishing a protec- 
tive institutional web to facilitate blame avoidance. 
4.4.2 I989 Asbestos Product Ban 
Through the I976 Toxic Substances Control Act, Congress delegated 
broad powers to the EPA to regulate toxic substances when piecemeal 
regulation by other agencies was deemed insufficient to protect public 
health. In I984, the EPA attempted to use these powers to phase down 
and ban the use of certain asbestos products. However, its initial 
attempts were thwarted by opposition from industry interests and the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Twight, i99i). Executive 
pressure drove the outcome, as OMB used its regulatory review auth- 
ority 5 under Executive Order 1229I to 'surreptitiously relay the position 
of interested parties' in a way that the House subcommittee on oversight 
and investigations deemed 'an unlawful abuse of power' (US House, 
i985b: 387; I985c: 7). 
Criticized by some members of Congress for this capitulation to OMB 
and industry pressure (US House, I985b, I985c), the EPA renewed its 
resolve to press forward with the regulations. The EPA reformulated its 
proposal so as to accommodate OMB's criticisms, gained OMB's 
approval, and announced its proposed rulemaking on 2gJanuary i 986. 
Despite this approval, however, OMB's resistance continued. It met 
off the record with Canadian officials to assuage their concerns regard- 
ing Canada's asbestos interests, describing OMB's strategies for con- 
tinued opposition to the EPA rule. OMB official Robert Bedell coached 
the Canadians on ways to oppose the EPA's proposal and invited them 
to submit additional information directly to OMB. Rep. Ron Wyden 
(Ore.) characterized OMB's actions as 'conspiring with officials of a 
foreign government to sabotage the proposed rule' (US House, I986c: 
136). 
Not until I989 - five years after its initial efforts and thirteen years 
after enactment of the TSCA - did the EPA adopt regulations phasing 
down and banning use of asbestos products. The I989 regulations 
instituted a prospective ban on the manufacture, processing, impor- 
tation, and distribution of asbestos products such as asbestos clothing, 
floor tile, felt, cement sheet, friction products (including brake linings 
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and pads), paper, cement pipe, and shingles (54 Federal Register 29460, 
12 July I989). Designed to be phased in over an eight year period, the 
ban will be fully effective in 1997. 
This case is remarkable for several reasons. First, we again encounter 
Congress's blame-avoiding predilection to delegate responsibility. 
Second, we see strong evidence of asbestos industry influence on federal 
decisionmakers, reflected in executive branch pressure on the EPA - 
pressure strong enough to block even the proposal for rulemaking until 
I986. Third, the increase in congressional pressure on the EPA to resist 
the OMB and industry interests occurred beginning in I985, about the 
time when the exogenous political constraint of public awareness 
became conducive to full-scale blame avoidance. At the expected time, 
Congress positioned itself politically to claim credit for dealing with 
asbestos hazards now more fully understood by the public, 
simultaneously insulating itself from blame for any political missteps by 
the EPA. 
While some wonder why it took until I989 to initiate a ban on prod- 
ucts known to be hazardous for decades, others view this as an instance 
of overregulation (Morrall, I986; Viscusi, I989: 99-Ioo). From the 
theoretical perspective of this paper, neither occurrence is unexpected. 
Observed policymaking in this instance - whether or not these particu- 
lar regulations are judged economically inefficient - is fully consistent 
with the predicted responsiveness of congressional policy to changing 
political constraints on transaction-cost augmentation. 
5. Implications for Future Research 
This paper has described the choice between credit claiming and blame 
avoidance as a function of officeholders' ability to practice transaction- 
cost augmentation. Transaction costs facing the public on political 
issues have been shown to be malleable within bounds whose scope - 
from the government's perspective - is determined both endogenously 
and exogenously. We have seen that the model yields distinctive predic- 
tions about the timing of public policy changes and about the types of 
transaction-cost augmentation likely to accompany open credit claim- 
ing, concealed credit claiming, early-stage blame avoidance, and full- 
scale blame avoidance. 
Whereas other models imply that a change from credit claiming to 
blame avoidance will occur when officeholders recognize that a policy 
imposes high per capita costs on a sizeable portion of their constituency, 
this model predicts that the change is most likely to occur when 
exogenously determined constraints on transaction-cost augmentation 
make it impossible for officeholders to blunt the negative electoral conse- 
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quences of the harm-generating policy. This model further predicts that, 
until such a political environment materializes, officeholders will use 
transaction-cost augmentation to sustain credit-claiming strategies on 
behalf of the policy's beneficiaries. 
In the future, the model's predictions can be assessed against the 
evolution of policies pertaining to issues other than the asbestos case 
examined here. For example, further research might investigate the 
evolution of the US government's hazardous waste policies, the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law and its implemen- 
tation, Forest Service policies, nuclear power policies, savings and loan 
industry policies, and other policy issues for consistency with the predic- 
tions of this model. 
Future research might also explore the degree to which the US experi- 
ence is exceptional. Political striving for power, autonomy, and esteem is 
not confined to the US. While constraints will differ internationally, 
political manifestations of credit claiming and blame avoidance involv- 
ing transaction-cost augmentation can be expected to be apparent in 
cultures and institutional contexts outside the US. 
Of course, differences in political institutions strongly affect politi- 
cians' ability to control information flows and other types of transaction 
costs, and hence their ability to claim credit or avoid blame. Conse- 
quently, this model offers extensive opportunities for cross-cultural com- 
parison and prediction with respect to specific governmental policies. If, 
as this model suggests, policy-specific transaction costs facing citizens 
are politically malleable, one can make predictions concerning how the 
incentive and ability to practice transaction-cost augmentation in speci- 
fic policy contexts will differ in different countries. 
Institutional inducements for this behavior will vary depending on a 
nation's political structure (e.g., authoritarian or democratic regime), 
economic status (e.g., Third World or industrialized nation), and other 
variables. Based on the institutional structure of government and upon 
the nation's level of economic development, this model would generate 
different predictions concerning the evolution of asbestos (or some 
other) policy in India or China than in the United States. The incentive 
for government officials to practice transaction-cost augmentation 
regarding an issue like asbestos is undoubtedly greater the poorer the 
nation, while their ability to practice transaction-cost augmentation is 
greater the more extensive the government's political power and the less 
educated the citizenry. 16 Consistent with these expectations, Dahl (i 989) 
reported that Canada currently 'is exporting close to half its asbestos to 
the Third World, where many workers are still oblivious to its dangers.' 
The incentive to practice transaction-cost augmentation also depends 
on the economic importance of relevant interest groups in a country. As 
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we have seen, Canada, one of the world's largest asbestos producers, not 
only has attempted to manipulate US asbestos policy but also has con- 
ducted major promotional efforts in Third World countries that lack 
both knowledge about asbestos and a regulatory framework for dealing 
with it (Sentes, I989). Canada has made major inroads in Thailand, 
where 'Construction workers, who didn't even know what asbestos was, 
were enveloped in clouds of dust as they used power saws to cut asbestos 
cement pipes and sheeting,' and 'Outside the plant the workers' children 
were roaming the company compound among discarded equipment, 
empty asbestos bags, and mounds of waste asbestos' (Sentes, I989: 7). 
That the balance of producer, user, and consumer interests affects out- 
comes also seems consistent with the Swedish experience (Kelman, 
I98I: 77-80). More detailed evaluation of these and related issues in an 
international context awaits further research. 
If this model accurately portrays a characteristic aspect of political 
decisionmaking, one may reflect on its policy implications. Given a 
policy issue such as asbestos with substantial but difficult to detect 
adverse effects on a particular constituency segment, and given poli- 
cymakers' predilection for transaction-cost augmentation, which of the 
four policy stances discussed in Section 3 is most likely to facilitate 
decisionmaking in accord with the views of an informed citizenry? 
Perhaps none. 
In the presence of transaction-cost augmentation, open or concealed 
credit claiming is clearly incompatible with citizens' ability to make 
informed risk-benefit tradeoffs. These policy stances tend to stifle the 
information dissemination that would facilitate individual choice based 
on risk aversion and opportunity costs. Preliminary blame avoidance 
has the virtue of impelling actions that spread risk information to the 
general public and discouraging further credit-claiming actions on 
behalf of industry interests that would exacerbate the harm. However, 
this policy mien characteristically spawns measures that promise more 
than they deliver, imparting false perceptions of security. Full-scale 
blame avoidance, by comparison, involves added potential to inspire 
unjustifiably burdensome regulation. 
Officeholders will continue to augment transaction costs subject to 
prevailing constraints. Citizens will continue to receive information dis- 
torted by politicians' efforts to shape it to their own ends. Policymaking 
will be improved to the extent that institutional structure facilitates 
competition in these information-generation functions, thereby more 
rapidly and more severely constraining self-serving political attempts to 
keep public knowledge in check. 
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NOTES 
. By focusing chiefly on US congressional behavior, this article does not denigrate the importance 
of the federal bureaucracy and executive branch in shaping asbestos policy nor imply that 
Congress dominates day-to-day agency decisionmaking. Congress's authorization and 
appropriation decisions establish constraints on agency behavior, but within those bounds 
agency decisions are driven by a complex admixture of agency mission, executive branch 
pressure, congressional pressure, and other political and institutional variables (Wilson, 1989). 
In the US, many pressures besides those from Congress have shaped the resultant asbestos 
rules, most prominent among them pressure from the executive branch. That is consistent with 
the transaction-cost augmentation model (discussed in section 3), which predicts that executive 
pressure will more strongly influence agency decisionmaking than congressional decisionmak- 
ing on these issues. But in a larger sense many agency rules, in the long run, may come to reflect 
congressional policy - or at least acquiescence - given the existing constellation of pressures on 
Congress. This is not true if the principal-agent problem is so severe that none of Congress's 
policy-control mechanisms (budget, legislation, appointments) work (Moe, I987), or if 
agencies successfully practice long-term deception of Congress so that control mechanisms that 
would be triggered with correct information are never applied. But in other situations, Con- 
gress in the long run can (and sometimes does) exercise its authorization and appropriation 
powers to attempt to redirect agency policies not in accord with the views of a majority in the 
legislature. If it does not do so, then - viewed through the lens of constrained congressional 
power to alter the mission, authority, and resources of the agencies - it becomes more plausible 
over time to view agency regulatory activity as a manifestation of congressional will. 
2. Transaction costs denote costs of reaching and enforcing agreements, costs that exist due to the 
multi-party character of (political or economic) exchange. Transaction costs thus include infor- 
mation costs as well as other costs of negotiating and policing consensual decisions, whether in 
political or economic contexts. See note 3 for examples of transaction-cost augmentation. 
3. Previously cited examples of information-cost augmentation include: 'semantic efforts to alter 
public perception of the costs or benefits of government activities; forms of taxation that change 
people's perception of the actual tax burden imposed upon them; forms of subsidy that alter 
public perception of the benefit implied; forms of regulation that obscure its cost to the 
individual; choice of nonmarket (coercive) government procurement instead of purchase in the 
open market; the choice between taxation, subsidy, and regulation as means of benefiting 
producer groups; overt distortion of information about the nature and consequences of govern- 
ment activities; restriction of access to information about the nature of government activities 
prohibition of legitimate private contracts so as to increase the information costs of evaluating 
private alternatives to government control; and 'off-budget' techniques that increase private 
citizens' costs of assessing the full cost of certain government activities.' Other examples of 
governmental transaction-cost augmentation include: 'changing the locus of decision-making 
authority in ways that shift the transaction-cost burden entailed in effectuating or forestalling 
change in the role of government; unilaterally reinterpreting and implementing prevailing 
statutory and administrative rules to imbue the government with a changed scope of decision- 
making authority; changing the cost to private citizens of achieving political agreement to 
revise the scope of governmental authority; interaction between governmental agencies that 
alters the cost to individuals of revising the scope of government authority; fostering creation of 
institutional agents with incentives structured to encourage their promotion of federal policy in 
diverse areas; manipulating noninstitutional private agents through incentives structured to 
encourage their promotion of federal policy in diverse areas; concentrating the benefits and 
dispersing the harm born of government action; changing the cost to private individuals of 
effecting administrative or judicial challenge to the government's interpretation of its existing 
powers; and enacting federal rules that alter costs to agencies, courts, or other governmental 
bodies (or their functionaries) associated with interpreting and implementing their decision- 
making authority.' Twight, 1988: I50, notes I and 2. 
4. Natural transaction costs are the transaction costs that remain when everyone attempts to 
minimize the wealth-reducing impact of transaction costs. Natural transaction costs exclude 
those transaction costs deliberately created by one person to reduce the wealth of another. 
Natural transaction costs thus represent an unavoidable constraint, given existing technologi- 
cal and organizational means of reducing transaction costs. See Twight, 1988: 151, n. 9. 
5. These include agenda limitation, redefining the issue, throwing good money after bad, passing 
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the buck, finding a scapegoat, jumping on the bandwagon, diffusing blame by spreading it 
among many policymakers, and limiting discretion over choices representing credit-claiming 
opportunities in conflict with officeholders' policy preferences (Weaver, 1986: 384-390). 
Regarding delegation of responsibility to administrative agencies as a blame-avoiding strategy, 
see Wilson (1989: 246, note). 
6. While I classify asbestos policy during this period as concealed credit claiming, its blame 
avoiding features are apparent. By impeding the general public's acquisition of knowledge 
about the harm these policies caused, officeholders temporarily deflected blame for their 
initiation and continuation of these policies. However, it is useful to distinguish this type of cost 
concealment, feasible only in a situation characterized by relatively high natural transaction 
costs, from the blame-avoidance strategies employed (as with asbestos policy after 1970) when 
natural transaction costs facing the public on a policy question are relatively low. 
7. Although the danger to those who worked with the raw fibers was well known in the 1930s, 
controversy remained concerning the risk to workers who handled asbestos insulation. While 
scientific literature suggested the hazard much earlier, the New York Academy of Sciences' 
international conference on the biological effects of asbestos held in i964 irrefutably established 
the magnitude of the threat to insulators. 
8. The congressional dominance model, developed by Weingast and Moran (I983), Fiorina 
(i98i), McCubbins and Schwartz (i984), and others, has been challenged by Moe (i987). See 
Wilson (1989: 254-256) and note I, supra. 
9. 36 Federal Register 10466, 29 May 1971; 36 Federal Register 23207, 7 December 197I; 37 Federal 
Register 113I8, 7 June I972; 5I Federal Register 22612, 20 June I986. Acting under court order 
[Building & Construction Trades Department v. Brock, 838 F.2d I258 (D.C. Cir., i988)], OSHA 
recently proposed to reduce the permissible exposure limit to o. I f/cc (55 Federal Register 297 I 2, 
20 July I 990). 
io. The rule required inspections and mandated notification of parents and school personnel of any 
friable asbestos-containing materials found. However, inspections did not have to be made by 
qualified personnel, and no abatement actions were required. Compliance was achieved in only 
about a third of the affected schools (Christensen & Larscheid, 1988: 462). 
ii. See, for example, H.R. i626, the 'Asbestos Workers' Recovery Act,' and H.R. 3090, the 
'Occupational Disease Compensation Act of i985,' both ggth Cong., Ist Sess.; as well as the 
'Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of I982,' 97th Cong., 2d Sess. For discussion 
of these bills, see US House, I985a and US House, i982a. Leaders of victims' interest groups 
were not deceived. Opposing such bills in i985, Paul Safchuck, President of the White Lung 
Association, asked members of Congress 'If you are really so sure that this is such a good 
system for compensating us, why don't you let us decide if we want to use it? ... [I]f you take 
away our rights to use the courts around this question, you have taken away one of our basic 
rights as American citizens' (US House, I985a: 247). 
12. A 1977 bill entitled the 'Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act' - introduced by Rep. 
Millicent Fenwick, whose district was home to the Johns Manville Corporation - epitomized 
parochial use of the asbestos compensation issue. (Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation 
Act, H.R. 8689, 2 August 1977, 95th Cong., Ist Sess). These were not, however, single-sponsor 
measures. For example, the Asbestos Workers Recovery Act was sponsored by 5 senators and 
65 representatives (U.S. Senate, I985a: 79). 
13. Robert Willmore of the US Department of Justice noted the interest-group politics impeding 
the bills: '[P]art of the difficulty of any legislative effort is that there are too many interest 
groups seeking something out of the legislation other than solving the asbestos litigation crisis. 
... As long as those forces are as effective as they seem to be today, any effort at enacting 
legislation is going to be futile' (US House, 1985a: 306-307). 
14. These studies concluded that the EPA's asbestos product ban, as proposed in I986, involved 
costs per life saved of $I04,200,000 - far in excess of estimates of private valuation of life and 
greatly in excess of costs per life saved in many other regulatory programs (Morrall, i986: 30, 
34). However, since the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) generated the underlying 
data, OMB's political agenda regarding asbestos also is relevant to impartial assessment of 
these estimates. See section 4.4.2, infra. 
I5. OMB authority to review proposed agency regulations stems from Executive Order I2291, 46 
Federal Register I 3193, I 9 February I 98 I, and Executive Order I 2498, 5o Federal Register 1036, 8 
January 1985. According to Rep. James Florio (NJ.), one reason OMB resisted the EPA bans 
was fear that such regulatory action would increase pressure on the government to 'assume 
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some financial responsibility' for claims in asbestos lawsuits brought by shipyard workers (US 
House, I984: 2). 
16. The extraordinary pollution levels in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union seem consistent 
with these suppositions. Also seemingly consistent is the fact that, when home-country asbestos 
regulations were tightened, British firms moved overseas to India, where they maintained piles 
of asbestos waste open to children who played on it (US House, 1983b: 301 ). 
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